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For successful language use, interlocutors must be able to accurately assess their
shared knowledge (“common ground”). Such knowledge can be accumulated through
linguistic and non-linguistic context, but the same context can be associated with
different patterns of knowledge, depending on the interlocutor’s participant role
(Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark, 1992). Although there is substantial evidence that children’s
ability to model partners’ knowledge develops gradually, most such evidence focuses
on non-linguistic context. We investigated the extent to which 8- to 10-year-old children
can assess common ground developed through prior linguistic context, and whether this
is sensitive to variations in participant role. Children repeatedly described tangram figures
to another child, and then described the same figures to a third child who had been a
side-participant, an overhearer, or absent during the initial conversation. Children showed
evidence of partner modeling, producing shorter referential expressions with repeated
mention to the same partner. Moreover, they demonstrated sensitivity to differences
in common ground with the third child based on participant role on some but not all
measures (e.g., description length, but not definiteness). Our results suggest that by ten,
children make distinctions about common ground accumulated through prior linguistic
context but do not yet consistently deploy this knowledge in an adult-like way.
Keywords: children, dialogue, common ground, referential communication, participant role
INTRODUCTION
Learning to use language successfully requires more than simply acquiring words to express
particular concepts and the grammar to combine those words to form particular propositions; it
also involves learning when to use which words and which grammatical forms to particular listeners
so that the speaker’s meaning is appropriately communicated to the addressee. Adults appear to
use information from a range of sources to shape the way in which they design their utterances
to be easily understood. Research with children suggests that they begin to show sensitivity to a
conversational partner’s perspective in their language use from an early age, but it is still unclear
what factors they take into account when modeling their partner’s knowledge, and exactly how
such beliefs about their partner’s knowledge are manifested in their language production. In this
research, we consider whether 8 to 10-year-old children are able to draw appropriate inferences
about their partners’ knowledge on the basis of their partners’ participation in previous dialogue,
and examine how such inferences might be reflected in the language they produce.
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Speakers can refer to things in many different ways; for
example, the same entity can be described as a dog or the
fluffy Labrador from down the road. This is particularly the
case for entities with low codability such as tangrams, which
can usually be conceptualized in very different ways (e.g., as a
skater vs. a chicken) depending on a speaker’s perspective (Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). How then does a speaker choose a
particular referring expression to use? Substantial research has
suggested that speakers’ choices involve audience design (Bell,
1984), or a consideration of what the addressee is likely to
understand. To do this, speakers draw on their common ground,
the knowledge that they believe themselves to share with their
listeners.
Clark and Marshall (1981) identified three possible sources
of shared knowledge. One important source is beliefs about the
cultural communities to which their listeners belong (Fussell
and Krauss, 1992). For example, if the speaker believes that
she and the addressee are both members of the University
of Edinburgh community, she can assume that they share
knowledge about particular buildings, people, procedures, and
so on. Adults consistently use such beliefs to choose between
alternative referring expressions (e.g., whether to refer to a
building as “McEwan Hall” vs. “The round building with the
dome”; Isaacs and Clark, 1987).
But assumptions about shared knowledge can also be based
on evidence that is tied to particular interactions. Speakers can
make reference to the physical context in which they and their
listeners are situated, and assume that an object (or indeed
any kind of experience) that is physically co-present, and of
which listeners might be aware, constitutes part of their common
ground. Similarly, they can make reference to previous physical
co-presence (e.g., common past experiences).
More relevantly for our concerns, they can also make
reference to preceding linguistic context, in other words the
language that the speaker and listener have previously used
together (in the current or previous conversations), and the
meanings that they have jointly established for these utterances.
Thus when a speaker produces an utterance in the presence of
a particular listener (e.g., “This tangram looks like a chicken”),
its linguistic content (e.g., words, syntax, phonology) becomes
part of their linguistic common ground. In addition, their shared
understanding of the meaning of this utterance (the situation
model that it maps onto; Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998) becomes
part of their linguistic common ground.
However, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) suggested that the
reference of an utterance (i.e., the link between the linguistic
expression and the particular referent to which it is intended
to refer) becomes part of common ground only following a
collaborative process that requires the participation of both
speaker and addressee to establish a mutual belief that the
addressee has correctly understood the speaker’s intended
reference. Only when the speaker and addressee mutually accept
that the addressee has understood the speaker sufficiently can
the reference enter their common ground. Once this mutual
acceptance has been reached, the speaker can subsequently
assume that the addressee will understand that reference
correctly if she uses it again. The speaker and addressee therefore
form a referential pact for how to refer to the object (e.g., as a
chicken).
Accordingly, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) showed that
when speakers (Directors) described a set of tangrams to the
same partners (Matchers), they initially tended to produce
extended descriptions and indefinite references (e.g., “looks like
a person who’s ice skating, except they’re sticking two arms out
in front”), which were shaped by feedback from their partners
over a number of turns (just 18% of initial descriptions were
immediately accepted by the Matcher, in what Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs termed a basic exchange) until both participants were
satisfied that understanding had been achieved. When they
subsequently referred to the same tangrams, speakers tended
to use definite and considerably shorter references (e.g., “the
ice skater”), and addressees were able to accept these without
requiring further elaboration. Brennan and Clark (1996) showed
that speakers also produced fewer hedge expressions (indicating
provisionality; e.g., sort of, a bit) on repeated reference. The result
of these adaptations was that communication became faster and
more efficient, requiring fewer words and fewer turns.
These findings suggest that speakers’ choice of referring
expressions was affected by their previous discourse with a
partner (see also Garrod and Anderson, 1987). Brennan and
Clark (1996) subsequently showed that these effects were partner-
specific: Speakers used the same referring expressions repeatedly
with the same partner, even when the context made them over-
informative. Referential pacts also affect comprehension, with
addressees showing slower reaction times to identify referents
when the speaker violates a referential pact by using a new term
for a referent, even if it is otherwise an appropriate description
(e.g., Metzing and Brennan, 2003; Shintel and Keysar, 2007;
Brown-Schmidt, 2009a).
Clark and Carlson (1982) noted that dialogues may also
involve roles other than speaker and addressee. For example,
a person may be a ratified participant in a conversation, but
not be directly addressed by the speaker. Clark (1992) proposed
that such side participants accrue common ground in the same
way as speakers and addressees; they share responsibility for
tracking what is said and for ensuring that they understand the
speaker. The speaker can therefore assume that anything that
forms part of their common ground with an addressee also forms
part of their common ground with a side participant. In contrast,
overhearers are not ratified participants in the conversation:
Although they hear what the speaker says, they are not under any
responsibility to maintain a record of the discourse or to ensure
that they have understood the speaker (and by corollary, do not
have privileges to collaborate to reach understanding). They do
not therefore accumulate common ground with the speaker in
the same way as the addressee, and the speaker cannot assume
that overhearers have access to the same common ground as
an addressee. In accord with this proposal, Schober and Clark
(1989) showed that overhearers had a poorer understanding of
a director’s descriptions in a tangram task than addressees, even
when they heard the entire dialogue andwere given the advantage
of being able to pause and replay the director’s descriptions,
suggesting that they did not have access to the same common
ground as addressees.
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Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) showed that such differences
in common ground associated with different participant roles
were reflected in speakers’ referential behavior. Speakers
repeatedly described a set of tangrams to a partner (as in Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Matcher A), before describing the same
set to a different partner (Matcher B), who had previously played
one of four roles: a silent side participant (seated next to the
Director during her interactions with Matcher A), an omniscient
bystander (watching and listening on a monitor in a separate
room), an overhearer (seated behind the Director in such a way
that they could hear the director andmatcher A’s conversation but
could not see any of the referents), or a naïve participant (seated
outside the experimental room engaged in a separate task, and so
unable to see or hear any of the conversation).
On the first round following the changeover, Directors were
fastest and used fewest words with former side participants,
followed by omniscient bystanders; they were slowest and
used most words with overhearers and naïve participants.
They also produced significantly more indefinite references
(and correspondingly fewer definite references) when Matcher
B had been a simple bystander or naïve participant than a
side participant or omniscient bystander. These results are
consistent with Directors making different assumptions about
the common ground that they shared with Matcher B on the
basis of participant role. When Matcher B had been a side
participant or omniscient bystander, Directors treated them
similarly to Matcher A. In contrast, Directors treated overhearers
in a similar manner to naïve participants, assuming little or
no common ground. Thus, although overhearers had been able
to hear descriptions, Directors acted as if this information was
insufficient for successful reference without knowledge of the
referent that each description was anchored to.
In sum, there is evidence that adult speakers are sensitive
to variations in the information that they share with their
addressees, and assume different levels of common ground
depending on their addressee’s participant role in previous
discourse. Although there may be some leakages (e.g., failures
to initially accommodate common ground during the earliest
stages of processing; Horton and Keysar, 1996; Lane and Ferreira,
2008), adults tend to produce referential expressions that reflect
these assumptions, with respect to the semantic content of their
referring expressions (e.g., use of alternative conceptualizations),
the amount of information they provide (e.g., shorter vs. longer
referring expressions), and the form in which they express
this information (e.g., use of definite vs. indefinite referring
expressions).
Does children’s referential communication similarly reflect
their beliefs about what their partner is likely to understand?
Certainly, children appear to be aware from an early age that
people may have different knowledge from their own (e.g., Perner
et al., 1987; Astington and Gopnik, 1991), and reflect this in
their non-verbal communicative behavior (e.g., pointing and
gesturing; Perner et al., 1987; Liszkowski et al., 2008). But is
this awareness reflected in their language use, and what kinds of
evidence are their beliefs about shared and unshared knowledge
based on?
Some studies have shown that children, like adults, adapt
their language production to reflect beliefs about their addressees’
likely knowledge based on community membership. For
example, children younger than five adapt the grammar and
vocabulary of their utterances depending on their addressee’s
identity (e.g., producing less complex grammar and vocabulary
when addressing a baby or a child than an adult; Shatz and
Gelman, 1973; Sachs and Devin, 1976; Hansson et al., 2000;
Hoff, 2010). This is consistent with a coarse degree of audience
design that does not require detailed modeling of an addressee’s
knowledge, but can be based on broad distinctions (e.g., Galati
and Brennan, 2010).
Children also show sensitivity to common ground based
on past and present physical co-presence, though their
ability to accommodate this information in their referential
communication varies. Many studies have suggested that
children are poor at producing unambiguous referential
expressions to pick out one object from a complex array of
objects with similar characteristics until well into school age (e.g.,
Glucksberg et al., 1966; Krauss and Glucksberg, 1969; Dickson,
1982; Deutsch and Pechmann, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1995, 1998).
For example, Deutsch and Pechmann (1982) found that half of
6-year-olds (and a fifth of 9-year-olds) were unable to produce
unambiguous referring expressions on their first attempt (e.g.,
saying the “red one” in a context involving several red objects),
although they were responsive to their addressees’ feedback.
Equally, Anderson et al. (1991) found that 7- to 8-year-
olds (and 9- to 10-year-olds to a less marked degree) in route-
giving dialogues that involved mismatching maps tended to
inappropriately introduce new referents using definite references.
Thus younger children presupposed that referents were shared
with their addressees, rather than collaboratively establishing
their shared status and a referential pact for how to refer to them
(and their addressees were equally poor at providing feedback
when referents were not in fact shared).
Such difficulties have been interpreted in terms of egocentric
processing (Piaget, 1959). However, they may also reflect
children’s difficulties in determining relevant dimensions of
contrast (e.g., Sonnenschein and Whitehurst, 1984). Recent
studies have shown that by five, children can produce referring
expressions whose content reflects the information that the child
believes to be in perceptual common ground when the context
makes it easier for the child to discriminate privileged from
mutually shared knowledge. Hence 5-year-olds are more likely to
produce an adjective to unambiguously pick out an object when
there is a competitor object visible to both the child and their
addressee than when the competitor is visible only to the child
(e.g., Nadig and Sedivy, 2002; Bahtiyar and Küntay, 2009; Nilsen
et al., 2009). Matthews et al. (2006) found that 3- and 4-year-olds
also adapted the form of their referring expressions, such that
their choice of (more informative) lexical NPs (e.g., “The clown”)
vs. (less informative) pronouns (e.g., “he”) to refer to an entity was
affected by whether the referent was visible to the addressee or
not, although they still frequently failed to do so (e.g., 4-year-olds
inappropriately produced pronouns on a third of trials where the
referent was visually inaccessible).
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In addition, older children adapt their referential behavior
on the basis of previous physical co-presence, suggesting
that in this age group the ability to engage in audience
design based on shared physical context is not contingent
on the context being concurrently available for consultation.
Sonnenschein (1988) found that 6- to 9-year-old children
produced referential expressions that contained more (possibly
redundant) information when pretending to describe a toy for
a stranger or friend with no shared experience than for a friend
with whom they shared a common experience. Taken together,
these results suggest that by school age, children are able to assess
common ground based on past and current physical co-presence
to at least some extent. Moreover, these assessments may affect
both the amount of information provided in, and the form of,
children’s referential expressions, although they may not do so
consistently and children’s referential expressions may not always
be optimal (e.g., in terms of redundancy).
There has been much less research on children’s assumptions
about common ground based on linguistic co-presence, and the
extent to which these constrain referential processing. Unlike
common ground based on concurrent physical co-presence,
where the relevant context is available for consultation, common
ground based on linguistic co-presence requires the child to be
able to maintain and continuously update relevant information
in memory. As such, it might be both more complex and more
effortful to track. In comprehension,Matthews et al. (2010) found
that 3- and 5-year-olds were slower to pick up and move an
object when their partner referred to it using a different name
(e.g., “truck”) than she had previously used to refer to it (e.g.,
“car”), than when a different partner, who had not previously
named the object, referred to it using the new name (cf. Metzing
and Brennan, 2003; Shintel and Keysar, 2007; Brown-Schmidt,
2009a). Graham et al. (2014) replicated these effects when the
referential pact violation related to use of an adjective (e.g.,
“fluffy dog” vs. “spotted dog,” for a dog that was both fluffy and
spotted), rather than different conceptualizations of the object at
a categorical level. These results suggest that in comprehension,
even pre-school children are sensitive to linguistic common
ground, and specifically the referential pacts that they and a
particular partner have established in previous discourse.
However, although these results suggest that children track
the linguistic common ground that they have established with
a partner, and are able to use this information to constrain
comprehension by the age of four, children do not appear to use
linguistic common ground to guide their production of referring
expressions until later in development. Köymen et al. (2014) had
4- and 6-year-old children describe objects to a partner, and then
describe the same objects in a different visual context to the same
or a different partner. Six-year-olds were sensitive to whether
or not they had previously established relevant referential pacts
with a partner: If they had, they re-used the referring expression
they had previously (tacitly) agreed; if they had not, they chose
the referring expression that was most appropriate given the
context of the array. Thus, their referential choices reflected
audience design based on linguistic common ground. In contrast,
4-year-olds consistently produced referring expressions that were
appropriate given the visual context, and showed no sensitivity
to whether or not they and their addressee had previously
established relevant linguistic common ground.
Other evidence suggests that children’s ability to accumulate
and use linguistic common ground appropriately continues to
develop over a prolonged timecourse. Studies involving tasks in
which children must communicate interactively about complex
domains (e.g., maps with mismatching landmarks, mazes that
involve complex spatial arrays) show that school-aged children
experience difficulties in accurately modeling their partner’s
knowledge and responding to feedback up to the age of 11 and
beyond (Anderson et al., 1991, 1994; Garrod and Clark, 1993).
Garrod and Clark (1993) found that pairs of 7- to 8-year-olds
sometimes converged on the same referring expressions, but
without the same reference (e.g., both using where you/I started,
but to refer to different locations), suggesting that their choice
of referential expression was not based on a representation of
common ground that included the crucial connection between
a referring expression and its referent. Moreover, Anderson et al.
(1994) found that even at the age of 13, a substantial minority
of children performed no better than 7- to 8-year-olds. Clearly,
children’s ability to accumulate and flexibly exploit common
ground when they speak in dialogue does not reach full maturity
for many years.
Overall, the evidence suggests that, like adults, children
maintain a representation of the language that they have
previously used with a particular conversational partner, and
that this model of linguistic common ground affects their
referential processing to at least some extent from a young age,
although the ability to use this information appropriately during
the production of referential expressions appears to continue
to develop into the teen years. But at what age do children
develop amature understanding of the accumulation of linguistic
common ground? In particular, when do they become sensitive
to participant roles, and understand that people accumulate
common ground differently based on their participant role
within a dialogue? All previous research has focused on how
children use common ground accumulated within a dyadic
dialogue involving just a speaker and an addressee. Although
this research casts light on children’s assumptions about common
ground between speakers and addressees, it is not informative
about children’s awareness of the more general relationship
between participant roles and the establishment of shared
knowledge, in other words that listeners might develop shared
knowledge with the speaker differently depending on whether
they are licensed participants in the conversation or not.
The data from dyadic dialogues is compatible with children
having an adult-like understanding that when a speaker proposes
something and the addressee accepts it, the speaker’s proposal
becomes part of the linguistic common ground of all participants.
But it also compatible with children having an impoverished
understanding of the accumulation of linguistic common ground
based on a simple distinction between having been the addressee
of a particular utterance or not, or alternatively on having
been present when something was said or not. In the former
case, children might wrongly assume that someone who had
previously been a side-participant would not have access
to the language that was used in that conversation (or its
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interpretation); in the latter case, children might understand
that an addressee who was not previously present would not
have access to the language that was used in that conversation
(and its interpretation), but they might wrongly assume that an
overhearer who had been present during that conversation would
also have access to it.
To distinguish these alternatives, we carried out an experiment
in which eight- to ten-year old children played a tangram-
description and -matching task with a partner, as inWilkes-Gibbs
and Clark (1992). One child was designated the Director, and
played the game with another child (Matcher A) over four rounds
(A1–4); the same Director then played the same game, using the
same tangrams, with a second child (Matcher B; rounds B1-4).
WemanipulatedMatcher B’s participant role during the first four
rounds, in order to vary the linguistic common ground shared by
the Director and Matcher B during their subsequent interaction.
In the side-participant condition,Matcher B was seated next to
the Director (and had the same view of the Director’s tangrams as
the Director) throughout the Director’s rounds with Matcher A.
Thus, Matcher B was able to hear all the references made and
also verify whether these references were successfully resolved
(through Matcher A’s responses and the final outcome of each
round). In the overhearer condition, Matcher B was seated in
the same room but approximately 2 meters behind the Director
with her back to the Director and Matcher; she could therefore
hear references and exchanges with Matcher A, but could not
see either player’s tangrams, hence which tangram was being
referred to. In the naïve participant condition, Matcher B was
seated outside the experimental room; the Director and Matcher
B therefore shared no common ground. Following Wilkes-Gibbs
and Clark (1992), our primary measures were the total time taken
for Directors and Matchers to match the set of tangrams each
round, the number of correctly placed tangrams (measures of
collaborative communicative success), and—in order to assess
Directors’ initial audience design based on their a priori beliefs
about the Matcher’s knowledge—the mean number of words per
tangram that Directors used in their initial utterances before they
received any formative feedback from the Matcher. As additional
measures, we examined Directors’ use of definite or indefinite
reference (an index of whether Directors believed reference to be
shared) and number of hedges (an index of their commitment
to a particular conceptualization for a referent) in their initial
utterances, as well as the number of basic exchanges (where
the Director described a tangram and the Matcher immediately
accepted this description; an index of the adequacy of the
Director’s audience design from the Matcher’s perspective, i.e.,
whether the Matcher found the Director’s initial description
sufficient to identify the tangram).
Given previous findings that school-aged children are
sensitive to the accumulation of linguistic common ground with
an addressee, we expected that rounds A1–4 would show the
same pattern as found in adults (Krauss and Weinheimer, 1964;
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), specifically a tendency toward
greater efficiency and shorter, definite descriptions that the
addressee immediately accepts, which is assumed to reflect the
exploitation of common ground accumulated with the partner
over the course of the interaction.
However, our main interest is Directors’ behavior in round B1,
when interacting with a new partner. If children have an adult-
like expectation that all participants within a dialogue (whether
silent or actively involved) assume responsibility for their part in
the collaborative process, then we would expect the same pattern
as Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) found in adults. When playing
with a former side-participant, the Director should assume that
Matcher B has accumulated as much common ground during
rounds A1–4 as both the Director and Matcher A. She should
therefore assume thatMatcher B has access to the referential pacts
that she established with Matcher A, and so tend to use shorter,
definite references with few hedges, and her descriptions should
tend to be immediately comprehensible to Matcher B (yielding
the same pattern of basic exchanges as with Matcher A). We
would therefore expect the Director and Matcher B to take a
similar amount of time and to have a similar level of accuracy
as the Director and Matcher A did on round A4.
When playing the game with a former overhearer, the Director
should assume that although she may have heard the linguistic
expressions that were used, she would not have grounded their
reference, and therefore does not have access to the referential
pacts that she had established with Matcher A. She should
therefore treat overhearers in the same way as naïve participants
(as in Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark, 1992), yielding longer and more
informative descriptions than on round A4, with more indefinite
references andmore hedges. Because she has not yet established a
referential pact with Matcher B, we might expect that Matcher B
would be less likely to find her initial description comprehensible,
resulting in slower times, fewer basic exchanges, and lower
accuracy than in round A4.
If however children have a non-adult-like understanding of
the way in which linguistic common ground is accumulated,
then we would expect a different pattern. If they make a simple
distinction based on having been the addressee of a particular
utterance or not, then in all three conditions they should treat
their addressees as if they had no access to linguistic common
ground, using longer and more informative descriptions, with
fewer definite descriptions and more hedges, than round A4.
If instead children make a simple distinction based on
having been present when something was said or not, then
they should treat side-participants and overhearers (both of
whom were present during rounds A1–4) differently from
naïve participants (who were not). In that case, Directors
should produce similar descriptions in the side-participant
and overhearer conditions as on round A4, but in the naïve
participant condition they should produce longer and more
informative indefinite descriptions with more hedges. Because
Directors would be erroneously overestimating addressees’
knowledge in the overhearer condition, we might expect that
accuracy in this condition would be reduced compared to A4
(and total time might be increased).
These predictions are based on the assumption that children’s
beliefs about linguistic common ground will be manifested in the
same ways as in adults. However, the literature reviewed above
shows that children may sometimes show audience design with
respect to some aspects of language (e.g., use of lexical NPs vs.
pronouns) but not others (use of definite vs. indefinite NPs). It
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 213
Branigan et al. Participant Role in Children’s Referential Communication
may therefore be the case that children will show effects on some
measures but not on others. Such a pattern would be informative
about the extent to which children and adults manifest common
ground in their linguistic behavior in the same way.
METHODS
Participants
Seventy-two children aged between 8 and 10 years (mean: 9 years
7 months) recruited from a junior school in Nottinghamshire,
UK, participated in the experiment (i.e., 8 groups per condition).
This study was approved by the University of Edinburgh
Psychology Department Ethics committee. Parents provided
informed written consent for children’s participation, and
children provided verbal consent.
Materials
The experimental items were eight tangrams taken fromWilkes-
Gibbs and Clark (1992). Each tangram was printed in black on
cream card (15 by 20 cm) and was laminated. Nine copies were
made of the remaining eight tangrams to form the experimental
sets; one copy was used by the matcher, and eight copies were
used by the director (one set for each of the four rounds with each
matcher). The tangrams in each of the director’s sets were placed
in numbered envelopes in a randomized order. Two further
tangrams were used for demonstration and practice purposes.
To engage children with the task, we also provided a
cardboard pyramid with a “jungle adventurer” theme; if children
correctly matched four or more tangrams in a round, they could
move an adventurer figure up a level on the pyramid. To ensure
that children acting as Matcher B in the overhearer condition
remained focused, and to give them a defined role (so that
they were not perceived as an eavesdropper), we also prepared
a handout featuring four pyramids, each with eight levels, for
Matcher B to color in when they thought the Director and
Matcher A hadmatched one tangram.We also prepared a booklet
containing three mazes and games with a “jungle adventurer”
theme, to occupy children who were not currently engaged in the
game (Matcher B in the naïve participant condition for rounds
A1–4; Matcher A in all three conditions for rounds B1-B4).
Design
The experiment used a 3× 2 mixed design, with Participant Role
(side participant, overhearer or naïve participant) as a between-
subjects factor and Round (A1 and A4, or A4 and B1) as a
within-subjects factor.
Procedure
Groups of three children were taken into the experimental room
and told that they would play a “jungle adventurer” game, in
which they would match ancient symbols to crack a secret code
and reveal hidden treasure. Groups were randomly allocated
to one of the experimental conditions. The children drew lots
to decide roles. The Director and Matcher A took their seats,
and Matcher B sat next to the experimenter where she could
observe the table. A table divider in the middle of the table
prevented Director and Matcher from seeing each other’s cards.
The children were told that they would play the game in two
stages. First, the Director would describe the symbols in each
envelope to Matcher A, so that the Matcher could put them in
the same order; they could talk as much as needed to match
the figures quickly and accurately. The Director and Matcher A
would do this for four envelopes, all of which included the same
symbols but in a different order. The Director would then do the
same with Matcher B for a further four rounds.
One tangram was used as an example to familiarize the
children with the figures; a second was used as a practice,
to ensure that the Director provided sufficiently detailed
descriptions. After the practice, Matcher B was informed of
his role (in earshot of the director) before being taken to his
corresponding position as a side participant, overhearer or naïve
participant. Side participants were told that they would be able to
see and hear what the Director was doing in the game, although
they would not be playing it yet themselves. Overhearers were
told that they would not be able to see anything but that they
would be able to hear; they were also given the task of monitoring
the Director andMatcher A’s progress by coloring in levels on the
pyramid sheet. Naïve participants were told that they would not
be able to hear or see anything as they would be completing the
activity booklet outside the room.
The Director opened the first envelope and laid out the cards
in order. The Director and Matcher A then began their four
rounds. After each round, the experimenter checked the accuracy
of the card positions, and provided feedback about how many
were correctly placed. After the Director and Matcher A had
completed their four rounds (A1–4), Matcher B took the place of
Matcher A (and in all conditions Matcher A took the overhearer’s
seat and was given the activity booklet to complete).
The children’s interactions were audio-recorded using a
tape recorder. The experiment took approximately 45min to
complete.
Scoring
All rounds with Matcher A and Matcher B were timed from start
to finish, using a stopwatch. Success was measured at the end of
each round, by counting how many tangrams the children had
correctly matched and converting this to a percentage.
Rounds A1, A4, and B1 were transcribed by the second
author, and were independently coded by two coders who were
ignorant of the experimental hypotheses (Cohen’s kappa, a
measure of inter-coder reliability, is reported below; in all cases,
there was very high agreement). Disagreements were resolved by
discussion. The dependent variables were based on the director’s
initial descriptions, before they received any feedback from the
matcher. Feedback was classified as any sort of interruption
or interaction (e.g., a question or contribution) that led to
modification by the director; backchannel responses (e.g., yeah)
that encouraged to the director to continue were not classified
as feedback. Given that the initial description could only have
been influenced by the director’s a priori beliefs about their
matcher’s level of knowledge, this was judged to provide a more
accurate and uncontaminated measure of audience design based
on assumptions about linguistic common ground.
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We recorded themean number of words that the director used
to introduce each figure before feedback from the matcher was
recorded. Following Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992), we coded
directors’ initial references as definite reference if they included
the form the x, this/that x, or the one with x, or no article at all
(e.g., the next one is x), and as indefinite reference if they included
the form a/an x. (Other references were descriptive, e.g., it has
an X; Cohen’s kappa = 1). We further measured the number of
hedges that directors produced, focusing on four specific forms:
“sort of,” “kind of,” “a bit,” and “-ish” (Cohen’s kappa = 0.985).
We note that children also produced very high numbers of
another type of hedge, namely like (e.g., the next one’s got erm two
like half triangles). Although these hedges are potentially highly
informative, many examples could not be reliably discriminated
as hedges vs. expressions of similarity (e.g., it’s got like a leg),
and we therefore did not code their use. Finally, we recorded
the number of basic exchanges between directors and matchers.
An exchange was coded as a basic exchange if the matcher
immediately accepted the director’s initial description without
refashioning it in any way, so that the director immediately
continued to the next tangram (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Cohen’s kappa = 0.991). We give examples of each coding
category below.
1a. Definite reference: The seal
1b. Indefinite reference: A man sat with no arms and no legs,
like he’s sat down.
1c. Hedge [underlined]: Like a head kind of triangle thing
1d. Basic exchange: Director: Zombie
Matcher: Yeah
RESULTS
We analyzed seven dependent variables: Mean total time (in
seconds) per round; mean number of tangrams successfully
identified (out of eight) per round; mean number of words
per tangram in the Director’s initial description per round;
frequency of a definite referring expression in the Director’s
initial description per round; frequency of an indefinite referring
expression in the Director’s initial description per round;
frequency of a hedge expression in the Director’s initial
description per round; and frequency of a basic exchange per
round. Twenty-five data points (i.e., references to tangrams)
were excluded because the Director did not refer to the relevant
tangram (all involved the final tangram in a round, where the
correct tangram could be identified by elimination).
We used mixed effects models to analyze the data. When the
dependent variable was continuous, we modeled the response
using linear mixed effects models, and when the dependent
variable was binomial (basic exchange vs. not a basic exchange),
we modeled the responses using logit mixed effects models
(Baayen et al., 2008; Jaeger, 2008). For each binomial model,
we were interested in predicting the probability of a positive
response in the different conditions (i.e., that the children
used a basic exchange). For all analyses there were two fixed
effects (Participant Role and Round). Participant Role had three
levels (naïve participant vs. side participant vs. overhearer), and
Helmert coding was used to explore how the presence of Matcher
B affected the Director’s referring behavior. The first contrast
compared the naïve participant condition, where Matcher B
was not present during rounds A1–A4, to the mean of the
overhearer and side participant conditions, where Matcher B was
present during rounds A1–A4. A second contrast compared the
overhearer and side participant conditions. Round had two levels
for each analysis (A1 vs. A4 and A4 vs. B1); deviation coding was
used to contrast each level. Full random effects models would
not converge, so Round was removed from the random effects
structure. Only significant (or marginal; p < 0.1) results are
reported.
To confirm whether children showed the same patterns as
found in previous research on adults when repeatedly describing
the same referents to the same partner (e.g., Krauss and
Weinheimer, 1964; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Wilkes-Gibbs
and Clark, 1992), we began by comparing rounds A1 and A4.
Note that in these analyses, differences between Participant Role
conditions would reflect incidental differences (e.g., in individual
Directors’ communicative skills), because the Participant Role
manipulation was irrelevant at this stage. Any such differences in
rounds A1–3 would moreover be irrelevant to our key questions,
which hinge on differences between the final round with Matcher
A (i.e., A4) and the first round with Matcher B.
However, our primary interest was in Directors’ different
assumptions about linguistic common ground with Matcher B as
a function of Matcher B’s previous participant role during rounds
A1–4 with Matcher A. Hence the main comparisons of interest
are those examining Directors’ changes in behavior between their
final round with Matcher A (A4) and their first round with
Matcher B (B1).
Total Time Taken Per Round (Table 1)
Rounds A1–A4
The model comparing Rounds A1 and A4 revealed a
significant main effect of Round (β = −178.13, SE = 23.6,
t = −7.54, pz <0.001
1): Round A4 was completed faster than
A1 (For this and all other linear mixed model analyses, p-values
were calculated using a normal approximation). There was a
marginal interaction between Participant Role and Round when
naïve participant was contrasted with the two other conditions
(β = 92.25, SE = 50.1, t = 1.84, pz = 0.07): There was a
greater reduction between A1 and A4 in the naïve participant
condition (240 s) than the mean of the other two conditions
(147 s). However, a model that included simple main effects for
only round A4 showed that there was no difference between
Participant Role conditions in round A4 (both pz > 0.30).
A second set of analyses examined whether there was a
reduction in time across rounds A1–A4 in each Participant Role
condition. For these analyses, rounds A1, A2, A3, and A4 were
included in a model and Round was coded using polynomial
coding. There was a significant linear trend for each Participant
Role, with A1 being the slowest round and A4 being the fastest
(all pz < 0.01).
1For this and all other linear mixed model analyses, p-values were calculated using
a normal approximation.
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TABLE 1 | Mean total time taken (sec) and percentage of tangrams correctly matched, by Round and Participant Role; standard deviation is in square
brackets.
Naïve Participant Overhearer Side-Participant
A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1
Total time (sec) 349 [91.7] 109 [57.7] 315 [190.4] 293 [166.5] 118 [48.4] 219 [165.8] 256 [115.7] 137 [78.6] 115 [87.0]
% correct 70.3 [30.6] 84.4 [18.6] 75.0 [22.2] 56.3 [32.7] 64.1 [27.1] 53.1 [25.7] 42.2 [28.3] 70.3 [29.1] 82.8 [20.0]
Rounds A4-B1
The model comparing rounds A4 and B1 with Helmert contrasts
between the naïve participant condition and the other two
conditions, and between the overhearer vs. side participant
conditions, revealed a significant main effect of Round (β =
95.17, SE = 27.0, t = 3.53, pz < 0.001); overall, round
B1 was completed more slowly than A4. There was also a
significant interaction between Participant Role and Round when
naïve participant was contrasted with the other two conditions
(β = −165.7, SE = 57.3, t = −2.89, pz < 0.01), and a marginal
interaction for overhearer vs. side participant (β = −122.63,
SE = 66.1, t = 1.85, pz = 0.06). Round B1 was 206 and 101 s
slower than A4 when the matcher was a former naïve participant
or overhearer respectively, but 22 s faster than A4 when the
matcher was a former side participant.
A model that included simple main effects for round B1
showed a significant difference between the naive participant and
the other two conditions (β = −145.3, SE = 53.2, t = −2.73,
pz < 0.01); and a marginal difference between overhearer and
side participant (β = 101.73, SE = 54.8, t = 1.86, pz = 0.06).
Round B1 was slower when Directors were describing to a naïve
participant than when they were describing to an overhearer or
side participant. Directors were also slower when Matcher B had
been an overhearer than when they had been a side participant.
Number of Tangrams Correctly Matched
(Table 1)
Rounds A1–A4
The model comparing accuracy on rounds A1 and A4 revealed a
significant main effect of Participant Role for naïve participant vs.
the other two conditions (β = −1.50, SE= 0.66, t = −2.27, pz <
0.05); there were more correctly matched tangrams in the naïve
participant condition than in the other two conditions. There
were no differences between the overhearer and side participant
conditions. There was also a main effect of Round (β = 1.33,
SE = 0.54, t = −2.49, pz < 0.05; matchers correctly matched
more tangrams in round A4 than A1. A model that included
simple main effects for round A4 showed a marginal difference
between the naïve participant and other two conditions (β =
−1.41, SE = 0.76, t = −1.87, pz = 0.06), with more correct
tangrams in the naïve participant condition.
Rounds A4-B1
The model comparing Rounds A4 and B1 including Helmert
contrasts showed a marginal main effect of Participant Role for
naïve participant vs. the other two conditions (β = −1.01,
SE = 0.57, t = −1.78, pz = 0.07); participants correctly
matched more tangrams in the naïve participant condition than
the overhearer and side participant conditions (irrespective of
round). A model analysing simple main effects for round B1
only showed a significant difference for the overhearer vs. side
participant conditions (β = −2.19, SE = 1.03, t = −2.13,
pz < 0.05), with more correct tangrams in the side participant
condition.
Mean Number of Words Per Tangram
(Table 2)
Rounds A1–A4
There was a significant main effect of Round (β = −11.83,
SE = 1.29, t = −9.13, pz < 0.001); Directors produced
fewer words in their initial descriptions (prior to feedback) in
A4 than in A1. There was a significant two-way interaction
between Participant Role and Round when naïve participant was
contrasted with the two other conditions (β = 8.39, SE = 2.75,
t = 3.05, pz < 0.01); Directors’ initial descriptions reduced more
from A1 to A4 in the naïve participant condition. There was
also a significant two-way interaction between Participant Role
and Round when overhearer was contrasted with side participant
(β = −6.52, SE = 3.17, t = −2.05, pz < 0.05); Directors’
initial descriptions reducedmore fromA1 toA4 in the overhearer
condition.
However a model that included simple main effects for
round A4 showed no differences between the naïve participant
and other two conditions, nor between overhearer and side
participant (all pz> 0.48); by A4, Directors in all conditions were
producing a similar number of words to describe the tangrams in
their initial descriptions.
Rounds A4-B1
The model comparing rounds A4 and B1 revealed a significant
main effect of Round (β = −6.70, SE = 1.23, t = −5.45,
pz < 0.001); overall, Directors produced more words in their
initial descriptions on their first round with matcher B than
their last round with matcher A. There were also significant
interactions between Participant Role and Round in the naïve
participant condition contrasted with the other two conditions
(β = 15.89, SE = 2.61, t = 6.08, pz < 0.001), and for overhearer
vs. side participant (β = −6.07, SE = 3.01, t = −2.02, pz <
0.05). Directors used more words in their initial descriptions
when addressing a new partner (Matcher B) who had been
a naïve participant, and to a lesser extent when addressing a
former overhearer. In contrast, Directors in the side participant
condition used fewer words in their initial descriptions when
describing tangrams to Matcher B for the first time than when
describing the same tangrams to Matcher A for the fourth time.
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TABLE 2 | Mean number of words per tangram in Director’s initial description, by Round and Participant Role; standard deviation is in square brackets.
Naïve Participant Overhearer Side-Participant
A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1
Words/tangram 32.40 [19.3] 15.13 [12.4] 33.05 [23.4] 26.94 [17.6] 14.17 [7.4] 18.67 [10.1] 23.48 [16.6] 17.63 [14.2] 15.91 [11.7]
A model analysing simple main effects for round B1 showed
a significant difference only between the naïve participant
condition contrasted with the other two conditions (β = −14.49,
SE = 4.30, t = −3.37, pz < 0.001). Directors produced
more words when they knew that Matcher B was a naïve
participant.
Definite and Indefinite References (Table 3)
Rounds A1–A4
Definite references
As no directors produced definite references in round A1,
these data were not suitable for logit mixed effect models. All
three Participant Roles showed an increase in definite references
between A1 and A4. A model analysing simple main effects
for round A4 showed no difference between participant role
conditions (pz > 0.96).
Indefinite references
There was a significant main effect of Round (β = −0.70,
SE = 0.29, t = −2.39, pz < 0.05); children produced fewer
indefinite references on A4 than A1. There were also two-
way interactions between Participant Role and Round when the
naïve participant condition was contrasted with the other two
conditions (β = −1.28, SE= 0.59, t = −2.19, pz < 0.05), and for
overhearer vs. side participant (β = 3.13, SE = 0.75, t = −4.18,
pz < 0.001); Directors with a side participant initially produced
the highest number of indefinite references but then substantially
reduced their indefinite references between A1 and A4. Directors
in the naïve participant condition produced the lowest number
of indefinite references in A1, and both they and Directors in
the overhearer condition showed little change across rounds. A
model analysing simple main effects on round A4 showed only a
marginal difference between the overhearer and side participant
conditions (pz = 0.08), with more indefinite references in the
overhearer than side participant condition (36 vs. 19).
Rounds A4-B1
Definite references
The model comparing rounds A4 and B1 revealed a significant
main effect of Round (β = 4.23, SE= 1.51, Z = 2.81, pz < 0.001);
Directors produced fewer definite references on their first round
with matcher B than their last round with matcher A. The
interaction with Participant Role was not significant, despite
the greater number of definite references produced in B1 by
Directors in the side participant condition. Closer inspection
revealed that all definite references in the side participant
condition (across all rounds) were produced by the same three
directors.
Indefinite references
The model comparing rounds A4 and B1 showed a significant
main effect of Round (β = −0.70, SE = 0.30, Z = 2.31, pz <
0.05); Directors produced more indefinite references in round B1
than in A4, irrespective of participant role.
Hedges (Table 4)
Rounds A1–A4
The model revealed a significant main effect of Round
(β = −0.23, SE = 0.05, t = −4.91, pz < 0.001), indicating
that the children produced fewer hedges on the fourth round
with matcher A. There was also a significant interaction between
Round and Participant Role for overhearer vs. side participant
(β = −031, SE = 0.11, t = −2.71, pz < 0.01): Directors reduced
their number of hedges between Rounds A1 and A4 to a greater
extent in the overhearer condition (23 vs. 3).
Rounds A4-B1
The model comparing rounds A4 and B1 revealed a significant
main effect of Round (β = −0.11, SE = 0.04, t = −2.94,
pz < 0.01); Directors produced more hedges on B1 than on A4,
irrespective of participant role.
Basic Exchanges (Table 3)
Rounds A1–A4
The model revealed a significant main effect of Round (β = 1.17,
SE = 0.28, Z = 4.14, pz < 0.001); although there was a high
proportion of basic exchanges even in round A1 (at least half
of all descriptions in every condition), this number increased
from A1 to A4. A model analysing simple main effects on round
A4 showed no difference between participant role conditions on
round A4 (psz > 0.19).
Rounds A4-B1
The model comparing rounds A4 and B1 revealed a significant
interaction between Participant Role and Round for the contrast
between the overhearer and side participant conditions (β =
2.23, SE = 0.76, Z = −2.92, pz < 0.01); basic exchanges
decreased when the director changed partners in the overhearer
condition, but increased in the side participant condition. A
model analysing simple main effects for round B1 showed a
marginal difference only between the naïve participant condition
contrasted with the other two conditions (β = 1.15, SE = 0.63,
Z = 1.84, pz = 0.06). Directors produced more words when they
knew that Matcher B was a naïve participant.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our experiment set out to examine 8-10-year-old children’s
assumptions about the accrual of linguistic common ground,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 213
Branigan et al. Participant Role in Children’s Referential Communication
TABLE 3 | Frequency of definite and indefinite references in Director’s initial description, and basic exchanges, by Round and Participant Role;
percentage of total tangrams per round is in parentheses, and standard deviation is in square brackets.
Naïve Participant Overhearer Side-Participant
A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1
Def. refs 0 (0.0%) [0.0] 20 (31.3%) [3.2] 3 (4.7%) [1.1] 0 (0.0%) [0.0] 15 (23.4%) [2.8] 5 (7.8%) [2.7] 0 (0.0%) [0.0] 24 (37.5%) [4.1] 22 (34.4%) [3.8]
Indef. refs 23 (35.9%) [2.5] 24 (37.5%) [3.3] 30 (46.9%) [3.1] 33 (51.6%) [2.7] 36 (56.3%) [3.4] 40 (62.5%) [3.0] 42 (65.6%) [3.4] 19 (29.7%) [3.0] 25 (39.1%) [3.0]
Basic exch. 32 (50.0%) [1.6] 50 (78.1%) [1.9] 41 (64.1%) [2.6] 44 (68.8%) [2.4] 52 (81.3%) [2.0] 43 (67.2%) [2.7] 42 (65.6%) [2.9] 46 (71.9%) [2.7] 53 (82.8%) [1.6]
TABLE 4 | Frequency of hedges in Director’s initial description, by Round and Participant Role; standard deviation is in square brackets.
Naïve Participant Overhearer Side-Participant
A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1 A1 A4 B1
Hedges 19 [3.9] 1 [0.4] 8 [2.1] 30 [5.1] 7 [1.5] 15 [3.0] 6 [2.1] 3 [0.7] 8 [2.4]
and how this would affect their language use in a referential
communication task. Specifically, we were interested in whether
they would display an adult-like appreciation of differences
in how common ground accumulates based on distinctions
in listeners’ participant roles. Previous research has focused
exclusively on speaker-addressee pairings, and has suggested
that children make assumptions that addressees have access
to shared linguistic information in a way that people who
have been absent from the conversation do not. However, such
evidence does not demonstrate that children have a mature
understanding of how differences in participant roles and the
responsibilities associated with being a licensed participant in
a conversation affect the accrual of common ground. Children
might instead use simpler distinctions when assessing common
ground, either overestimating its accumulation (by assuming
that all listeners have access to it, irrespective of whether they
are licensed participants), or underestimating its accumulation
(by assuming that only addressees have access to it). We tested
these possibilities by having children play a game in which they
described the same set of tangrams repeatedly to another child
and then described them again to a third child who had seen and
heard the initial conversation, had only heard the conversation,
or had neither seen nor heard the conversation.
We first consider the results from rounds A1 to A4
(before any change in partner), and their implications for
children’s accumulation of common ground in speaker-addressee
pairings. The fact that Directors produced progressively shorter
descriptions for the tangrams as they repeatedly described
them to the same Matcher is consistent with previous research
on adults (e.g., Krauss and Weinheimer, 1964; Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). This shortening occurred for Directors’
initial descriptions, prior to receiving any formative feedback
from the Matcher, and therefore suggests that Directors were
exploiting their knowledge of the linguistic common ground
that they had built up with the Matcher to design, a priori,
referring expressions that the Matcher would be able to
understand. Analyses of Matchers’ tangram-matching accuracy
and time taken to complete each round suggest that Directors
effectively exploited common ground in this way: Despite the
shortening in initial referring expressions across rounds (from
27.6 words per tangram in A1 to 15.65 words in A4), tangram-
matching accuracy increased (from 56.3 to 72.9%), and the time
taken to complete each round decreased (from 299 to 121 s).
Additionally, Matchers were more likely to accept the shorter
initial descriptions in round A4 immediately without requiring
further information, than the longer initial descriptions in A1
(77.1 vs. 61.5% basic exchanges respectively).
In other words, with increasing interactionwith their partners,
Directors produced shorter descriptions that were nevertheless
communicatively more effective and more efficient. Our results
therefore show that when 8–10-year-olds encounter novel
objects with no conventional label, they are able not only to
initially generate appropriate referring expressions for them in
collaboration with their addressee, but also to subsequently draw
on this shared linguistic information to design more concise
but comprehensible references. These findings therefore extend
previous research showing that children make use of referential
pacts when referring to objects with conventional labels (Köymen
et al., 2014).
Children also showed sensitivity to linguistic common ground
in other aspects of their language. Their use of definite references
(presupposing shared knowledge) changed across rounds. In
round A1, where the Director and Matcher had no linguistic
common ground, Directors never used definite references;
in A4, where they had accrued common ground over the
preceding three rounds, they used definite references on 30.7%
trials. Children also produced fewer references that included
expressions of uncertainty (hedges such as sort of ) as they
developed common ground with their partner, dropping from 18
hedges per round in A1 to 4 hedges per round in A4. Overall,
then, the results of rounds A1–A4, prior to the manipulation of
prior participant role, demonstrate that when interacting with
a single partner, children of this age are able to track and use
linguistic common ground, for at least some aspects of their
language, in ways that enhance communication.
Unexpectedly, there were some differences between
conditions in rounds A1–A4 (e.g., more correctly matched
tangrams in the Naïve Participant condition), even though at this
point the role of Matcher A was equivalent across conditions.
It seems most likely that such differences reflect coincidental
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variations in individual children’s performance rather than any
effect of the experimental manipulation. As is clear from our
results, and consistent with previous findings (e.g., Anderson
et al., 1994), there were substantial individual differences in
children’s performance (e.g., in A1, the mean number of words in
Directors’ initial descriptions ranged from 7 to 55, and Matchers’
tangram accuracy ranged from 0 to 100%).
We now turn to our main question of interest, namely
children’s assumptions about the accumulation of common
ground based on differences in participant role. Our critical
analyses therefore concerned changes in Directors’ behavior
between rounds A4 (their last round with Matcher A) and B1
(their first round withMatcher B).We were interested in whether
children would show an adultlike pattern of treating former
side participants in B1 in the same way as they had treated
Matcher A in A4 (i.e., assuming equal access to common ground),
in contrast to former overhearers and naïve participants; or
would show a non-adultlike pattern, either treating all new
partners alike (assuming no access to common ground, and
yielding uniform differences between behavior on A4 and B1,
irrespective of participant role), or treating both side participants
and overhearers on B1 in the same way as they had treated
Matcher A on A4 (with only naïve participants being treated
differently). Our results suggest that although children have
some understanding that linguistic common ground accumulates
differently according to distinctions in listeners’ participant roles,
their understanding is not yet fully adultlike. They also suggest
(in conjunction with analyses of rounds A1–A4) that the ways
in which children draw on linguistic common ground in their
language use differs from adults.
The primary evidence that children are sensitive to differences
in participant role comes from analyses of the length of
Directors’ initial descriptions. These suggest that Directors made
a tripartite distinction between the information available to
former side participants, naïve participants, and overhearers.
When addressing former side participants for the first time, they
produced initial referring expressions that were very similar (and
in fact, slightly shorter) than those that they produced when
addressing Matcher A for the fourth time (A4: 17.63 words; B:
15.91 words). This is consistent with Directors assuming that
side participants in a dialogue had access to the same linguistic
common ground as addressees, and so could benefit from the
same kind of concise referring expression.
Their ability to produce appropriate referring expressions
in B1 on the basis of linguistic common ground accrued over
rounds A1–A4 is supported by the fact that total time taken to
complete the round did not increase when they first interacted
with a new partner (indeed, it decreased by 22 s from A4 to
B1) and at the same time tangram matching accuracy did not
decrease (rather, increased by 12.5%); additionally, the number
of turns in which Matchers were able to accept the initial
description immediately did not decrease (rather, increased by
9.9%). Hence, Directors behaved as though they had the same
common ground with former side participants as with former
addressees; moreover, their ensuing referring expressions were
communicatively effective, showing successful audience design
on the basis of these assumptions.
In contrast, when Directors addressed former naïve
participants for the first time, they produced initial referring
expressions that were considerably longer than those that they
had produced when addressing Matcher A for the fourth time
(A4: 15.13 vs. B1: 33.05 words; this difference was significantly
larger than the side participant/overhearer conditions). This
result suggests that when Directors designed their referring
expressions in B1, they assumed—prior to receiving any
feedback from the Matcher—that a new Matcher who had
been outside the room during the initial rounds required more
information than Matcher A had required in A4; in other words,
they assumed that naïve participants did not have access to the
same common ground as addressees. Accordingly, the total time
taken to complete the round increased by 206 s from A4 to B1,
though tangram matching accuracy did not differ.
Directors also appeared to make a further distinction
concerning the information available to former overhearers.
Their initial referring expressions for Matcher B in round B1
were slightly longer than those for Matcher A in round A4
(A4: 14.17; B1: 18.67). The significant difference in the mean
number of words per tangram in A4 vs. B1 in the overhearer
and side participant conditions implies that Directors did not
assume that former overhearers and former side participants
had access to the same common ground. However, nor did they
appear to treat former overhearers as having the same (lack of)
knowledge as naive participants. The fact that Directors only
slightly increased the length of their initial referring expressions
suggests that they overestimated former overhearers’ knowledge,
and that this impacted negatively on communication. The total
time taken to complete the round increased by 101 s, but
more critically tangram accuracy in B1 was lower than in the
side-participant condition; additionally, Matchers were less able
to immediately accept Directors’ initial referring expressions—
indicating perceived understanding—in the overhearer condition
than in the side participant condition (note that the two
conditions did not differ on either measure in A4). It appears that
Directors did not fully grasp the limited extent to which prior
exposure to referring expressions alone, without simultaneous
exposure to the reference of those expressions, was likely to
facilitate subsequent comprehension.
In sum, evidence from the length of Directors’ initial
referring expressions suggests that childrenmade largely accurate
assumptions about the extent to which former naïve participants
and former side participants had access to linguistic common
ground, and designed their referring expressions accordingly, but
also provides some suggestion that they were less accurate in
gauging former overhearers’ shared knowledge, with an apparent
tendency to overestimate it. This pattern differs from that found
in adults, who tend to treat addressees who previously had access
to the linguistic content, but not the reference, of a prior dialogue
in the same way as addressees who had no previous access to a
prior dialogue (Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark, 1992).
However, this sensitivity to participant role is not borne out
in other aspects of our data. Overall, Directors did not behave
differently to former side participants, overhearers and naïve
participants with respect to their use of definite and indefinite
referring expressions, or hedges. Based on previous research
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on adults, we might have expected that the use of definites
(implying shared knowledge) would decrease from A4 to B1 in
the naïve participant condition relative to the side participant
and overhearer conditions, and that the use of indefinites would
conversely increase (Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark, 1992). We might
also have expected the use of hedges (indicating provisionality
prior to agreement on a referential pact) to increase (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Brennan and Clark, 1996).
Although children did show differences on all three measures
when interacting for the first time with a new partner (a lower
use of definites, and a higher use of indefinites and hedges, in B1
than A4), these differences were uniform across conditions when
the groups were considered as a whole. (However, we note that
there was considerable variation between individual children in
the use of hedges and definite references, suggesting that these
aspects of language use might be particularly subject to individual
differences in development; see also (Anderson et al., 1994;
Nilsen et al., 2009), for further evidence of individual differences
in dialogue skills). When considered alongside the evidence
discussed above that children are nevertheless sensitive to
differences in the accrual of linguistic common ground according
to participant role, this pattern suggests that children do not
accommodate these differences in their language in the same
way as adults. In this study, assumptions about common ground
manifested consistently in the length of children’s referring
expressions, but not the form of those expressions.
The conclusion that children and adults linguistically manifest
common ground differently is supported by evidence from
rounds A1 to A4. Although Directors showed increased use of
definite expressions between rounds A1 and A4, definites still
formed less than a third of their references in A4, and their use
of indefinite expressions did not decrease between A1 and A4,
remaining around two fifths of all references (41.6 vs. 41.2%).
In contrast, Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) found that by the
sixth round, Directors used definite references on 86.5% of trials
and indefinite references on 4.2%. Thus, in adults’ dialogue, there
was a very strong relationship between the accrual of common
ground and the use of definite expressions, whereas in our
children this tendency was considerably weaker.
These results are consistent with other evidence suggesting
that children do not use definite and indefinite reference in
the same way as adults (e.g., Maratsos, 1974; Warden, 1976;
Anderson et al., 1991). Most such research has found that
children tend to overuse definite expressions, for example when
first mentioning a referent that is unknown to the addressee.
In these studies, children tend to incorrectly assume that their
addressee has access to the same set of referents as themselves.
Our study suggests that in a different context, where children
knew that they had access to the same set of referents as their
addressee but these referents did not have conventional names
(and so could be conceptualized in multiple ways), children
tended to underuse definite expressions, relative to adults. That
is, they did not tend to use definite references that depended on
(non-conventional) referential pacts (e.g., referring to the rabbit),
although the shortening of referential expressions with increased
common ground suggests that they were aware of, and exploited,
these pacts (e.g., referring to a tangram in terms of its similarity to
a rabbit). These results suggest that even at the age of 8–10 years,
children’s use of definite and indefinite referring expressions may
differ from that of adults.
Finally, we consider other aspects of our results that suggest
further disparities between children’s and adults’ referential
processing in dialogue, focusing on rounds A1–A4 (to exclude
any influences associated with changes in partner and participant
role). Children’s performance was consistently and considerably
poorer than adults. Children’s error rates ranged from 42.7% (A1)
to 27.1% (A4). In contrast, Clark andWilkes-Gibbs (1986) found
error rates of around 2% in their studies (with a larger item set,
which should have increased the likelihood of misidentification).
The high error rate is not surprising in itself, but it is
indicative of the children’s limited ability to detect and/or
resolve misunderstandings. For an error to occur, Directors
and Matchers must have terminated the process of presenting
and accepting a reference inappropriately: The Director must
have failed to detect that the Matcher had selected the wrong
tangram, and the Matcher must have failed to realize that the
Director was referring to a tangram other than the one they had
selected. That is, they both inaccurately believed that the Matcher
had understood the Director correctly, and therefore allowed
the dialogue to move on. Thus although Matchers’ increasingly
accurate and faster performance across rounds in response
to progressively shorter initial descriptions demonstrates that
the Director and Matcher were able to build up and exploit
common ground to some extent, the relatively high error rate
overall indicates that this ability was still immature and far from
adultlike.
This conclusion is supported by evidence from the occurrence
of basic exchanges in rounds A1–4. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs
(1986) found that with adult participants, basic exchanges
occurred relatively infrequently in the first round of the task,
where participants had to identify novel objects for which
they had as yet established no common ground, but became
highly frequent in later rounds once common ground had been
established (round 1: 18%; round 4: 80%). Thus adult Directors
and Matchers tended to be cautious in their assumptions of
mutual understanding, and to initially exchange multiple turns
to establish confidence that understanding had been successfully
achieved. In contrast, our children showed very high levels of
basic exchanges even in the very first round (A1: 61.5%). Clearly,
in these trials Matchers believed that they had understood the
Directors, and Directors believed that Matchers had understood
them—the instructions, the structure of the game, and the
feedback provided by the experimenter after each round all
ensured that children were aware that the Matcher must identify
and place in the appropriate position the specific tangram
described by the Director—but the tangram accuracy data show
that this belief was often incorrect.
These results are consistent with many previous findings
suggesting that children may have difficulties both in evaluating
their addressee’s understanding and appropriately responding
when acting as speaker, and in detecting their own failure to
understand and/or appropriately requesting information when
acting as addressee (e.g., Bearison and Levey, 1977; Ironsmith
and Whitehurst, 1978; Whitehurst and Sonnenschein, 1981;
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Anderson et al., 1991, 1994; Garrod and Clark, 1993; Lloyd
et al., 1998). Thus in the same way that children may tend to
overestimate the information that they share with a partner,
they may also tend to overestimate the occurrence of mutual
understanding.
Our study focused on one age group, and as such we cannot
draw conclusions about the way in which, or age at which,
children might come to develop adult-like behavior. Previous
research suggests that even at the age of 13, a substantial minority
of children continue to show behavior that differs from that
found in experiments involving adults (Anderson et al., 1994).
(Note, however, that most such experiments involve a relatively
narrow population of highly educated individuals, i.e., college
students, whose performance may not be representative of the
adult population as a whole). The development of relevant
dialogue skills may in part be dependent on the maturation of
aspects of cognition such as executive function, such as the ability
to inhibit one’s own perspective. Certainly, research on both
child and adult dialogue has implicated inhibitory control and
working memory in online perspective-taking (Epley et al., 2004;
Brown-Schmidt, 2009b; Nilsen et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2010).
However, in our experiment, the fact that Directors produced
longer descriptions with naïve participants in B1 shows that
they were able to suppress their own knowledge appropriately,
suggesting that executive function (specifically inhibitory
control) may be less relevant to our results, though working
memory may have played some role. It therefore seems likely
that the development of adult-like behavior cannot be reduced
simply to the maturation of executive functions, and instead
involves the development of a more elaborated understanding of
what information is and is not shared by speakers and addressees
on the basis of previous discourse (e.g., whether speaker and
addressee share the reference of a referring expression).
We suggest that the interactions that children experience may
play an important role in shaping this developmental process.
Many studies have suggested that experience of communication
breakdown and its subsequent resolution through formative
feedback from listeners—whether at first-hand or through
observation—may play an important role in improving young
children’s performance in dialogue tasks (e.g., Robinson and
Robinson, 1981, 1985; Deutsch and Pechmann, 1982; Matthews
et al., 2007, 2012). In principle, all of the interactions that children
experience could give them valuable evidence about the accrual
of common ground under different circumstances. However,
given that formative feedback depends crucially on the listener,
and given that school-aged children– as our and other studies
show—are not always adept at gauging their own understanding
and providing informative feedback, it may be the case that
interactions with more mature language users (adults and near-
adults) play a particularly important role in developing relevant
skills and understanding even into the early teen years.
In conclusion, this research investigated what inferences 8–
10-year-old children were able to draw about their partners’
knowledge on the basis of their participation in previous
dialogue. Our results suggest that by this age, children have
some understanding that the accumulation of linguistic common
ground is affected by participant role. In particular, they assume
that side participants in a dialogue build up linguistic common
ground (and have access to this common ground in subsequent
dialogues involving the same speaker), and that overhearers do
not have access to this information to the same extent. These
assumptions are reflected in the amount of information that they
provide in their referring expressions. However, our results also
suggest that children are not fully adult-like at this age in both
their understanding and their linguistic use of common ground.
Children appear to overestimate the extent to which listeners
who overhear but do not participate in a dialogue accumulate
common ground, and do not use definiteness to reflect linguistic
common ground in the same way as adults. These results,
together with evidence of other limitations in children’s dialogue
skills (e.g., overestimations of mutual understanding) provide
further evidence that learning to use language successfully in
interaction is a slow process that continues to develop until well
into the school years.
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